

Supplementary information for
“The Myth of the Post-Communist Citizen:
Communist Legacies and Political Trust”

Social Science History

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Countries and years

Below is a list of the countries including in each wave of the European Social Survey analyzed.

2002

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Post-communist: Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia

2004

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Post-communist: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia

2006

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Post-communist: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine

2008

Western Europe: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Post-communist: Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine

2010

Western Europe: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Post-communist: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine

Covariate codings

Age. ESS data on age are self-reported in years.

Income. ESS data for income are self-reported income deciles, which ask the respondent to place themselves on rungs of a ladder economically. Distribution of this covariate are presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1: **Income and education.** Plot (a) shows the distribution of income deciles across both Western and Eastern Europe, while plot (b) shows the distribution of years of education. In both solid grey are post-communist citizens, dashed black Western Europeans.

Education. ESS data for education are coded as total years of education. Distribution of this covariate are presented in Figure 1.

Religiosity. ESS data for religiosity are self-reported answers on an 11-point Likert scale to a question asking how religious respondents considers themselves.

Political interest. ESS data for interest in politics are self-reported answers on an 4-point Likert scale to a question asking how interested respondents are in politics.

Demographic differences

As noted in the main manuscript, a third potential individual-level causal pathway—changed demographics—is also of little explanatory power. Modeling whether the post-communist trust deficit is a function of changed demographics is straightforward (and thus not included in the main section): one need only determine first whether the distribution of demographic features is significantly different in Central and Eastern as compared to Western Europe. If not, differences in demographics cannot account for divergent levels of trust (which is not to say that the *effect* of any given demographic variable might vary, which is the crux of the individual experience approach to legacies analyzed in the manuscript). If, however, it *is* significantly different, it may or may not be vital: aggregate demographic characteristics could account for lower levels of trust in post-communist countries only if they are in fact divergent, and if these demographic characteristics are effective predictors of trust. Put differently: it doesn’t matter if Eastern Europeans are significantly poorer than Western Europeans if income isn’t driving levels of trust.

Figure 1 plots two histograms: plot (a) shows the distribution of income (by decile within the respondent’s country), while plot (b) shows the distribution of years of formal

education. As with Figure 1 of the main manuscript, post-communist responses are solid gray, Western European dashed black. Plot (b) illustrates there is little difference in the distribution of education across Western and Eastern Europe in the ESS data.

Plot (a) in Figure 1, on the other hand, suggests divergent distributions: among post-communist respondents, poorer citizens are more prevalent. Those reporting to be in the bottom decile of income, for example, make up slightly more than 17% of the data for Eastern Europe and less than 5% for Western. Those in the upper half of their nation's respective income distribution are more prevalent among Western European respondents. Given that these are income deciles, each containing 10% of the population of the country in question, this suggests two possibilities. First, it could be the case that wealthy Eastern Europeans are less likely to answer the survey than their Western counterparts (and/or poor Western less likely than poor Eastern Europeans). Second, it is possible that Eastern Europeans are more likely to consider themselves poor than Western Europeans, who themselves are under-represented at the lowest levels of income. Regardless, the results of the main manuscript analyses suggest that even if there exists variation in these demographics, the salience of these factors is not helpful in explaining the trust deficit.

In the years after the collapse of communism there existed a widespread phenomenon of individuals with high levels of education and low incomes (Janos 2000), a result in no small part of high levels of income equality under communism. To the degree that this continues into the early years of the third post-communist decade, it is possible that despite similar distributions of education in Western and Eastern Europe there is a specific high-education, low-income concentration of post-communist citizens especially disenchanting with political institutions.

Cross tabulations of income and education, however, do not suggest this is the case. Figure 2 displays two heatmaps, each a visual display of the distribution of respondents classified into cells showing income (x-axis) and education (y-axis). Plot (a) shows post-communist countries, plot (b) Western European. Darker cells contain higher concentrations of individuals. The positive correlation between income and education is similar (0.32 and 0.35) in both subsets of data, although given the larger portion of poorer respondents in the post-communist data, the darkest cells (and thus most observations) are concentrated around 12 years of education and the third decile of income. This is not the case for Western Europe, where roughly an equal portion of respondents with 12 years of education are found between the fourth and eighth. While certainly there are more poor, highly-educated post-communist citizens than Western Europeans, they are not significantly poorer than the average respondents and, as noted, the correlation between income and education is almost identical across the continent. Furthermore, both plots show highly educated citizens (14–18 years of schooling) distributed fairly evenly throughout deciles of income. These data thus show at most minimal and unclear evidence for the contention that there might be an individual legacy of highly educated, low income, disenchanting post-communist citizens, as no sizable demographic exists in the region.

It is possible that communism affects the degree to which people are interested in politics, shown to be important for political trust (Catterberg and Morena 2005), as it was




Figure 2: **Income and education.** Two heatmaps showing the relationship between income and education. Plot (a) shows post-communist countries and plot (b) Western European. Darker cells are those with a higher proportion of respondents.

considered a truism in the first decade after communism that the synthesis of party and state made individuals less likely to engage in politics.¹ A similar logic might also apply to one’s religiosity (found to be important for explaining social trust, Mishler and Rose 1997), which was severely impeded by communist rule. Both sociodemographic variables, however, are distributed almost identically across Eastern and Western Europe, and tests show one cannot reject that they come from the same distribution. This makes it clear that either the distribution of people interested in politics or religious individuals across Western as opposed to Eastern Europe cannot explain divergent levels of trust.

It is likely that an individual’s satisfaction with different aspects of the state of their country is reflected in their political values. It is also plausible that this relationship differs as a result of the communist experience, with the link between satisfaction and trust attenuated or cut as a result of years of state socialism. The distributions of satisfaction with the economy, government, and democracy across the Western/Eastern European divide (not shown) are similar though not as severe as that of trust with the legal system or parliament, with Eastern Europeans showing mean levels of satisfaction 1–1.5 lower on the 11–category scale (as opposed to 1.5–2 for the trust questions). These differences suggest that it is plausible that the different levels of satisfaction in post-communist Europe might be in part driving the lower levels of trust, and a potential post-communist legacy.

Thus, there exists minimal support in ESS data for the third potential post-communist

¹Though common, this argument is curious considering mass involvements in politics characteristic of years immediately before and after the communist collapse (Urban 1997; Beissinger 2002; Pfaff 2006).

pathway, of different socio-demographics: while no support exists for the contention that simple demographic differences among religiosity, interest in politics, or education explain differences in levels of trust, as similar patterns are found in both East and West, income is distributed differently among post-communist respondents. Whether income differences explain lower levels of trust in Eastern Europe, however, is not yet clear: demographic differences are a necessary but not sufficient condition for such differences to be the causal pathway through which any legacy effects might run. This is because such differences existing need not imply they are important, as the main manuscript clearly demonstrates.

Temporal dimension

As noted, some have argued that the legacy argument would be accurate were there to be consistent change over time in the post-communist region such that the deficit were evaporating as time goes by. Boxplots in Figure 3 demonstrates that any temporal dimension of trust is doubtful: there is no temporal trend in changing levels of trust, as evidenced by the almost unchanging means and standard deviations around those means in each wave of the post-communist ESS data (data from Western Europe shows a similar lack of temporal trends, though obviously the means are significantly higher). If anything, an extremely small (and of course insignificant) *decrease* in trust is observed over time, contrary to the trends predicted by temporal legacy arguments.




Figure 3: **Distribution of post-communist trust over time.** Two boxplots showing the distribution of trust in the legal system (plot a) and trust in parliament (plot b) in post-communist countries in the 2002–10 waves of the European Social Survey. Boxes contain one standard deviation above and below the mean, which is shown by the horizontal black line (boxplots here show means not medians).

Figure 4 and Table 1 assess the degree to which there is a temporal element to political trust. Table 1 reports results of eight models of political trust including a temporal




Figure 4: **Trust over time.** Four hierarchical linear models of political trust, including a fixed effect for each wave of the European Social Survey to better assess any changes in trust over time.

covariate(s). Models 1–4 include year fixed effects, with a coefficient estimated for each wave of the European Social Survey, while Models 5–8 consider a temporal trend variable. Figure 4 visualizes Models 1–4 in the same manner as visualizations of regression models in the main article.

In all instances results provide evidence against any communist legacy the effects of which fade over time. Results are strongly similar across the East/West divide in all instances, and we see no consistency with regards to time across waves or types of political trust (legal system vs. parliament).

Table 1: **Trust over time.** Eight hierarchical linear models of political trust including a temporal covariate. Models 1–4 include covariates for each wave, while Models 5–8 include a trend covariate.

	Model 1 (Legal (Post-com.)	Model 2 (Legal (W. Europe)	Model 3 (Parliament (Post-com.)	Model 4 (Parliament (W. Europe)	Model 5 (Legal (Post-com.)	Model 6 (Legal (W. Europe)	Model 7 (Parliament (Post-com.)	Model 8 (Parliament (W. Europe)
(Intercept)	3.85** (0.22)	5.67** (0.17)	3.70** (0.20)	5.19** (0.15)	3.54** (0.22)	5.61** (0.17)	3.44** (0.20)	5.23** (0.15)
2010	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.38** (0.05)	-0.42** (0.02)				
2008	-0.21** (0.05)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.69** (0.05)	-0.18** (0.02)				
2006	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.16* (0.06)	-0.19** (0.03)				
2004	-0.35** (0.05)	-0.07* (0.02)	-0.59** (0.05)	-0.20** (0.02)				
Political interest	0.37** (0.03)	0.40** (0.02)	0.69** (0.03)	0.82** (0.01)	0.37** (0.03)	0.40** (0.02)	0.71** (0.03)	0.82** (0.01)
Religiosity	0.43** (0.03)	0.45** (0.02)	0.45** (0.03)	0.53** (0.01)	0.43** (0.03)	0.45** (0.02)	0.46** (0.03)	0.53** (0.01)
Years of education	0.05 (0.03)	0.40** (0.02)	0.11** (0.03)	0.31** (0.02)	0.06 (0.03)	0.41** (0.02)	0.11** (0.03)	0.31** (0.02)
Income (decile)	0.28** (0.03)	0.32** (0.02)	0.28** (0.03)	0.31** (0.02)	0.28** (0.03)	0.32** (0.02)	0.22** (0.03)	0.32** (0.02)
Age	-0.39** (0.03)	-0.11** (0.02)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.11** (0.02)	-0.39** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.02)	-0.16** (0.03)	-0.12** (0.01)
Year (trend)					0.03** (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.00)
BIC	176308.22	458088.14	172803.84	450267.68	176366.12	458071.63	173027.09	450323.77
Log Likelihood	-88090.78	-228974.84	-86338.59	-225064.61	-88135.56	-228983.89	-86466.05	-225109.96
Observations	38367	102580	38367	102580	38367	102580	38367	102580
Countries	13	19	13	19	13	19	13	19

** $p < 0.001$, * $p < 0.01$

Potential legacies of form of communist rule

As noted in the main article, rather than looking at a former Soviet Republic/Central and East European communist state dichotomy, one can also assess the form of communist rule via more nuanced ways. The dominant conceptualization of form of communist rule is offered by Kitschelt (2002), who contends that the structures of communist power and its relationship to society can be classified in one of three ways: patrimonial, bureaucratic authoritarian, or national consensus communism (for a recent discussion of form of rule and legacies applied to governance, see Ishiyama 2015).

As the name suggests, patrimonial communism based its rule on hierarchies of personal relationships among those in power; such was the form of rule of most Soviet republics and Balkan states. Bureaucratic authoritarian communism was found in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, according to Kitschelt (2002), and was typified by high levels of rational-bureaucratic institutionalization. Finally, national consensus communism was found in those regimes practicing “softer” forms of rule that left some small space for non-party activity, typified by Poland and Hungary. Three post-communist states are liminal according to this typology. While the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were part of the USSR, they avoided the high Stalinism of the 1930s. Furthermore, the degree to which their forms of rule in the post-war period after their annexation is contested, with some like Kitschelt contending there remained more intraregime contestation than the rest of the Soviet republics (note, however, their absorption into all-Union party and state structures and mass immigration into these states from the rest of the Soviet Union, both of which argue against such). Kitschelt, as a result, classifies them as borderline cases within the national consensus category of form of rule. Results below follow this logic: irregardless if one considers them national consensus, patrimonial like the other Soviet republics, or their own borderline category, no different results are found (and in fact only more strongly recommends against the usage of such a typology as compared to more simple alternatives).

While work stressing that the form of communist rule has had lasting effects has most typically examined only variation within the post-communist region (e.g. Kitschelt 2002, Ishiyama 2015), the logic inherent in the argument would suggest it is appropriate for analyses both within the region as well as in comparison to the non-communist states of Europe. If, after all, the form of rule has had substantively meaningful and lasting effects, it should be easily discerned in both contexts. To assess this, Tables 2 and 3 examine these differences across the divide and within the post-communist region, respectively. As noted above, rather than the Kitschelt typology one can employ a more simple dichotomy: in Table 2 this is whether a state is post-communist (as opposed to Western European), and in Table 3 this is whether the state is a former Soviet republic.

Looking at Table 2, it becomes clear that including a covariate capturing the form of communist rule produces no substantive insights beyond a simple post-communist dummy: in all instances the estimated effects of the specific form of communist rule are indistinguishable from one another, with confidence intervals for each form heavily overlapping in Models 2 and 4. Similarly, the estimated effects are indistinguishable from that of the post-communist dummy in Models 1 and 3, suggesting there is little in the way of added value in the form of

Table 2: **Form of communism.** Four hierarchical linear models of political trust including either a simple dummy for post-communist status and a trichotomous covariate for form of communist rule. Individual-level covariates are interacted with the post-communist dummy to assess differences between East and West.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Legal		Parliament	
(Intercept)	5.65*** (0.17)	5.65*** (0.16)	5.01*** (0.15)	5.01*** (0.15)
Post-communist	-1.89*** (0.27)		-1.76*** (0.24)	
Bur. authoritarian		-1.53** (0.52)		-1.37** (0.48)
National consensus		-1.63*** (0.31)		-1.72*** (0.29)
Patrimonial		-2.54*** (0.38)		-2.02*** (0.36)
Political interest	0.40*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.83*** (0.01)	0.83*** (0.01)
Pol. interest x P-C	0.36*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.02)	0.71*** (0.02)
Religiosity	0.45*** (0.02)	0.45*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.01)
Religiosity x P-C	0.43*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.02)	0.46*** (0.02)
Years of education	0.41*** (0.02)	0.41*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.02)
Education x P-C	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)
Income	0.32*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)
Income x P-C	0.34*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)
Age	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.13*** (0.01)
Age x P-C	-0.36*** (0.02)	-0.37*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)
BIC	634673.57	634692.62	623781.54	623803.91
Log Likelihood	-317253.79	-317251.46	-311807.78	-311807.11
Observations	140947	140947	140947	140947
Countries	32	32	32	32

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

communist rule covariate. Table 3, which looks solely at the post-communist region, shows largely the same results. The form of communist rule is never statistically significant when models are fit to trust in parliament (Models 5–8). When a form is statistically significant in models fit to trust in legal institutions (Models 1–4) it is driven entirely by the classification of the Baltic states: national consensus communism in Model 2 and the borderline category in Model 4 (the lack of significance in Model 3 is also driven by the Baltic states, as they are now in the reference category of patrimonial communism, along with the other former Soviet republics).

Further evidence of the lack of value-added of form of communist rule is found if one compares the goodness of fit of such models in Tables 2 and 3 to the comparable models with simple dichotomous measures of communism (either post-communist in models fit to east/west or FSU for models fit to just post-communist states). In all instances, across both tables, BIC scores suggest the more simple dichotomization is preferable, a better fit to the data..

Table 3: **Form of communism.** Eight hierarchical linear models of political trust including either a simple dummy for former Soviet republic status and a trichotomous covariate for form of communist rule, varying the classification of the Baltic states. The reference category for form of communist rule in Models 2–4 and 6–8 is patrimonial communism.

Baltic states:	Model 1	Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	Model 5	Model 6		Model 7	Model 8
	n/a	Nat'l consensus	Legal	Patrimonial	Borderline	n/a	Nat'l consensus	Patrimonial	Patrimonial	Borderline	
(Intercept)	3.78*** (0.27)	3.12*** (0.31)	3.12*** (0.31)	3.58*** (0.28)	3.12*** (0.31)	3.40*** (0.24)	2.99*** (0.33)	3.04*** (0.25)	2.99*** (0.33)	3.04*** (0.25)	2.99*** (0.33)
Former Soviet Union	-0.04 (0.43)					-0.39 (0.39)					
Bur. authoritarian		1.01 (0.54)		0.54 (0.59)	1.01 (0.53)		0.64 (0.58)	0.59 (0.53)	0.64 (0.58)	0.59 (0.53)	0.64 (0.57)
National consensus		0.91* (0.39)		0.31 (0.46)	0.78 (0.44)		0.30 (0.42)	0.37 (0.42)	0.30 (0.42)	0.37 (0.42)	0.42 (0.47)
Borderline					1.09* (0.47)						0.13 (0.51)
Political interest	0.36*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)		0.36*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)
Religiosity	0.43*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.03)		0.43*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)
Years of education	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)		0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)
Income (decile)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.03)		0.34*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
Age	-0.36*** (0.03)	-0.37*** (0.03)		-0.37*** (0.03)	-0.37*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)
BIC	176388.19	176393.71		176397.77	176403.82	173042.98	173053.28	173053.01	173053.50	173053.01	173063.50
Log Likelihood	-88146.60	-88144.08		-88146.11	-88143.86	-86473.99	-86473.86	-86473.73	-86473.70	-86473.73	-86473.70
Observations	38367	38367		38367	38367	38367	38367	38367	38367	38367	38367
Countries	13	13		13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Balance of power and legacies of transition

Both Fish (1998) and McFaul (2002) argue that the balance of power during the transition from communism had lasting effects on the form of post-communist regime. Specifically, McFaul argues that in those states where challengers to the communist power structures dominated the general result was democracy, as opposed to those states where communist incumbents dominated, which remained non-democratic. The result in those places where the balance of power was even or uncertain was something neither fully democratic nor autocratic. Is it possible that these transitions had lasting legacies on political trust, as they produced significant differences in the political landscapes across the post-communist region. In as much as those states that had post-communist leaders strongly associated with the prior regime, or worse performance with regard to political, economic, and governance-related factors, we might expect these states to have lower levels of trust in political institutions. This is, in effect, suggesting that the key divide in the region would not be the easy dichotomy of whether a state was a former Soviet republic, but a more complicated result of the transition.

To account for this possibility, Table 4 uses the typology of post-communist regimes advanced by McFaul (2002), including a covariate to capture the balance of power during transition (instead of looking at Soviet vs. non-Soviet communist regime). These are akin to the model results visualized in plots (a) and (b) of Figure 5 in the main manuscript. Here, Models 1–2 include the years spent under communist rule, Models 3–4 the cohort effects of one’s generation and age during the transition. The results in Table 4 demonstrate that the balance of power did not produce lasting transition legacies with regards to political trust: in all four models the balance of power covariates are far from statistically significant, and estimates are not consistent, as the effect for challengers is positive for trust in legal institutions but negative for trust in parliament (and far from statistically significant in each).

Table 4: **Legacies of transition.** Four hierarchical linear models of political trust within the post-communist region that account for the balance of power during transition rather than Soviet/non-Soviet communist regime. Models 1–2 replicate those from Figure 5 plot (a), accounting for years lived under communist rule; Models 3–4 those from Figure 5 plot (b), accounting for cohort.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Legal		Parliament	
(Intercept)	3.63*** (0.61)	3.70*** (0.64)	3.48*** (0.61)	3.62*** (0.64)
Political interest	0.37*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.72*** (0.03)
Religiosity	0.43*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)	0.42*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)
Years of education	0.05 (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Income (decile)	0.32*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)
Years under communism	-0.38*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.02)		
Child during transition			0.37*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.03)
Born after communism			0.79*** (0.08)	0.55*** (0.08)
Balance of power: challengers	0.42 (0.64)	-0.34 (0.68)	0.40 (0.64)	-0.35 (0.68)
Balance of power: even	-0.70 (0.70)	-0.95 (0.74)	-0.71 (0.70)	-0.97 (0.74)
BIC	176382.98	173061.02	176344.93	173016.89
Log Likelihood	-88138.72	-86477.74	-88114.41	-86450.39
Observations	38367	38367	38367	38367
Countries	13	13	13	13

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Other country-level covariates

As the main impetus of the models are to test the assertion that individual-level legacies remain salient in explaining divergent levels of trust in the post-communist region as compared to Western Europe, most models omit a variety of national-level covariates that might explain the differences. This is obviously not the case for those models in the main article that include measures of the quality of institutions/institutional performance, where one observes marked decreases in the divergent levels of trust. As there are other potential national-level covariates that might explain this divergence (relating as they do primarily to institutional performance rather than legacy effects), I present here the results of numerous models including these country-level covariates.

Table 5 shows the results of four hierarchical linear models, each fit respectively to the post-communist and Western European data and to trust in legal institutions and trust in parliament, this time including four country-level covariates: the log of per capita gross national income, the rate of inflation, economic growth, and inequality as measured by GINI coefficients (like other covariates, these are standardized to increase comparability). As can be seen by the significant differences in intercepts, these country-level covariates explain almost no variation in political trust across the east/west divide; in other words, the inclusion of these factors does not help explain the post-communist trust deficit. As compared to the models from Figure 2 in the main manuscript (regression output of which is included here in the appendix below in Table 10), the inclusion of these covariates shrinks the estimated difference in trust in legal institutions only slightly, from 1.9 (the intercept of the Western Europe model minus that of the post-communist model) to 1.58, a difference that remains highly significant; the difference for trust in parliament actually *increases*, from 1.8 to 1.9. Clearly, these national-level covariates are of little help in explaining the lower levels of political trust in the post-communist states.

Recall that in the main article the inclusion of a covariate that accounted for the performance of legal institutions was, however, able to strongly attenuate the post-communist trust deficit.² To demonstrate this as compared to the four other country-level covariates, Table 6 includes a country-level covariate to assess institutional performance. If it is the case that institutional performance rather than other national-level covariates help explain the divergence in trust across the communist divide, it provides further evidence against this deficit being the result of some explicit post-communist legacy. As the differences between the models show, once one includes the measure of performance of legal institutions, the difference between east and west shrinks rapidly, with the confidence intervals of the intercepts overlapping, similar to Figure plot (a) of Figure 7 of the main article.

A further way one can leverage the question of institutional performance is by aggregating the data and including both national-level covariates and a covariate indicating whether a country experienced communism. This is done in Table 7, which fits models to both Western and Eastern European data. Model 1 fits the data and includes a dummy

²This covariate is the World Bank Governance Indicators Rule of Law measure. As noted in the main article, while aware of the significant problems with the measure (Kurtz and Schrank 2007), it serves an appropriately crude purpose here.

Table 5: **Country-level covariates.** Four hierarchical linear models of political trust that include country-level covariates to potentially explain the divergences between trust in post-communist/Eastern and non-communist/Western Europe.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Legal		Parliament	
	(Post-com.)	(W. Europe)	(Post-com.)	(W. Europe)
(Intercept)	4.04*** (0.22)	5.62*** (0.16)	3.18*** (0.22)	5.12*** (0.17)
Political interest	0.38*** (0.03)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.82*** (0.01)
Religiosity	0.43*** (0.03)	0.45*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.03)	0.53*** (0.01)
Years of education	0.06 (0.03)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.02)
Income (decile)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.02)
Age	-0.39*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.02)
log(GNI/capita)	0.35*** (0.09)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.09)	-0.61*** (0.06)
Inflation	0.17*** (0.04)	-0.21*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.03)
Growth	-0.14*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.02)
Inequality (GINI)	-0.33*** (0.07)	-0.22** (0.07)	-0.53*** (0.06)	0.12 (0.07)
BIC	176308.79	458064.99	172976.32	450216.50
Log Likelihood	-88091.07	-228963.26	-86424.83	-225039.02
Observations	38367	102580	38367	102580
Countries	13	19	13	19

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

variable accounting for the communist experience and the four country-level covariates discussed above; Model 2 adds the institutional performance covariate. Once this is done, the deficit in trust observed in the post-communist data (here captured by the covariate for post-communism) is almost halved. The same pattern is observed between Models 3 and 4, which rather than including a dichotomous measure of communist experience include the Kitschelt measure of form of communism rule (here considering the Baltics as having national consensus communism). The result is highly similar, with the coefficient for each form

Table 6: **Country-level covariates and institutional performance.** Four hierarchical linear models of trust in legal institutions that include country-level covariates to potentially explain the divergences between trust in post-communist/Eastern and non-communist/Western Europe. Models 2 and 4 include a measure of institutional performance.

	Model 1 Post-communist	Model 2	Model 3 Western Europe	Model 4
(Intercept)	4.04*** (0.22)	4.73*** (0.24)	5.62*** (0.16)	5.44*** (0.13)
Political interest	0.38*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.02)
Religiosity	0.43*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.45*** (0.02)	0.45*** (0.02)
Years of education	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.02)
Income (decile)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.02)	0.33*** (0.02)
Age	-0.39*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)
log(GNI/capita)	0.35*** (0.09)	0.21* (0.10)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.13* (0.06)
Inflation	0.17*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.03)
Growth	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Inequality (GINI)	-0.33*** (0.07)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.22** (0.07)	-0.22** (0.07)
WBGi Rule of Law		1.15*** (0.22)		1.08*** (0.12)
BIC	176308.79	176292.79	458064.99	458001.81
Log Likelihood	-88091.07	-88077.79	-228963.26	-228925.90
Observations	38367	38367	102580	102580
Countries	13	13	19	19

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

of communism rule showing a marked decrease once the quality of institutions is accounted for, regardless of the inclusion of other country-level covariates that are related to overall conditions but not specifically the institution in question.

Tables 5–7 assess the differences between the post-communist countries and those without any potential communist legacy. As discussed in the main article, it is unlikely that if

Table 7: **Country-level covariates, institutional performance, and communism.** Four additional hierarchical linear models of trust in legal institutions that include country-level covariates to potentially explain the divergences between trust in post-communist/Eastern and non-communist/Western Europe.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	5.61*** (0.16)	5.45*** (0.15)	5.61*** (0.16)	5.45*** (0.15)
Political interest	0.39*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.01)
Religiosity	0.45*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)
Years of education	0.33*** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.01)
Income (decile)	0.30*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.01)
Age	-0.18*** (0.01)	-0.19*** (0.01)	-0.18*** (0.01)	-0.19*** (0.01)
log(GNI/capita)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
Inflation	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)
Growth	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
Inequality (GINI)	-0.40*** (0.05)	-0.36*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.36*** (0.05)
Post-communist	-1.67*** (0.25)	-0.91*** (0.25)		
WBGi Rule of Law		0.96*** (0.11)		0.97*** (0.11)
Bur. authoritarian			-1.65** (0.50)	-1.03* (0.47)
National consensus			-1.47*** (0.30)	-0.92** (0.29)
Patrimonial			-2.03*** (0.38)	-0.79* (0.38)
BIC	634756.52	634688.65	634778.56	634712.16
Log Likelihood	-317301.20	-317261.33	-317300.36	-317261.23
Observations	140947	140947	140947	140947
Countries	32	32	32	32

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

evidence for legacies in this context is minimal one will find strong evidence for legacies among the communist states. Nonetheless, to examine the issue in the most rigorously way possible, Tables 8 and 9 look at differences solely within the communist states, using national-level covariates and a variety of factors to account for varying experiences with communism and its collapse. Table 8 examines trust in legal institutions, Table 9 trust in parliament. In each, Model 1 includes the four country-level covariates, to which Model 2 adds the institutional performance measure for legal institutions: as in previous results, its inclusion drastically improves model fit according to BIC. Models 3–7 introduce different ways of accounting for differences among communist experiences: Model 3 uses a dichotomous covariate indicating whether a country was part of the Soviet Union; Models 4–6 use the Kitschelt form of communism typology, each respectively considering the form of rule in the Baltics national consensus, patrimonial, or borderline; and Model 7 includes the balance of power during the transition, according to the logic articulated by McFaul (2002).

The results of Tables 8 and 9 are unequivocal: in no instance is there any reason to think there are varying legacies across among the communist states, as no coefficient accounting for such variation ever reaches even the $p < 0.05$ level of statistical significance. Much like the results from plot (a) in Figure 7 in the main article, there is further evidence that the measure of institutional performance more able to capture the relevant issue—rule of law as opposed to voice and accountability—provides far better explanatory power, as the former improves rather than decreases model fit. Finally, it is worth noting that neither do they change the estimates of any other covariates in any more than the slightest of ways. Put simply, there is significant evidence against a communist legacy affecting political trust among the various post-communist states of Eastern Europe.

Table 8: **Country-level covariates within post-communist states.** Seven additional hierarchical linear models of trust in legal institutions that include country-level covariates to potentially explain the divergences among post-communist states.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	4.04*** (0.22)	4.73*** (0.24)	4.65*** (0.28)	4.81*** (0.45)	4.83*** (0.32)	4.80*** (0.44)	5.23*** (0.73)
Political interest	0.38*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)
Religiosity	0.43*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.03)
Years of education	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
Income (decile)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)
Age	-0.39*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.03)
log(GNI/capita)	0.35*** (0.09)	0.21* (0.10)	0.21* (0.10)	0.21* (0.10)	0.21* (0.10)	0.21* (0.10)	0.22* (0.10)
Inflation	0.17*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
Growth	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)
Inequality (GINI)	-0.33*** (0.07)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.26*** (0.07)
WBGU Rule of Law	1.15*** (0.22)	1.15*** (0.22)	1.15*** (0.22)	1.17*** (0.24)	1.17*** (0.22)	1.16*** (0.24)	1.16*** (0.24)
Former Soviet		0.21 (0.40)					
Bur. authoritarian				-0.06 (0.63)	-0.08 (0.57)	-0.06 (0.63)	
National consensus				-0.11 (0.47)	-0.24 (0.44)	-0.22 (0.52)	
Borderline						0.05 (0.57)	
Balance of power: challengers							-0.53 (0.74)
Balance of power: even							-0.59 (0.79)
BIC	176308.79	176292.79	176303.08	176313.84	176313.61	176324.15	176313.32
Log Likelihood	-88091.07	-88077.79	-88077.66	-88077.76	-88077.64	-88077.64	-88077.50
Observations	38367	38367	38367	38367	38367	38367	38367
Countries	13	13	13	13	13	13	13

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 9: **Country-level covariates within post-communist states.** Seven additional hierarchical linear models of trust in parliament that include country-level covariates to potentially explain the divergences among post-communist states.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	3.18*** (0.22)	3.28*** (0.26)	3.27*** (0.30)	3.24*** (0.50)	3.29*** (0.36)	3.24*** (0.50)	4.01*** (0.75)
Political interest	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.03)
Religiosity	0.47*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.03)
Years of education	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)
Income (decile)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)
Age	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)
log(GNI/capita)	-0.34*** (0.09)	-0.32*** (0.09)	-0.32*** (0.10)	-0.32*** (0.10)	-0.32*** (0.10)	-0.32*** (0.10)	-0.32*** (0.10)
Inflation	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Growth	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)
Inequality (GINI)	-0.53*** (0.06)	-0.52*** (0.06)	-0.52*** (0.07)	-0.52*** (0.07)	-0.52*** (0.07)	-0.52*** (0.07)	-0.52*** (0.07)
WBGI Voice & Accountability		0.13 (0.19)	0.13 (0.19)	0.12 (0.20)	0.13 (0.19)	0.12 (0.20)	0.07 (0.21)
FSU			0.03 (0.45)				
Bur. authoritarian				0.07 (0.71)	0.02 (0.63)	0.07 (0.71)	
National consensus				0.04 (0.53)	-0.04 (0.49)	0.01 (0.58)	
Borderline						0.09 (0.63)	
Balance of power: challengers							-0.74 (0.77)
Balance of power: even							-1.11 (0.84)
BIC	172976.32	172986.42	172996.97	173007.52	173007.52	173018.05	173005.89
Log Likelihood	-86424.83	-86424.60	-86424.60	-86424.60	-86424.60	-86424.59	-86423.78
Observations	38367	38367	38367	38367	38367	38367	38367
Countries	13	13	13	13	13	13	13

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 10: **Models from Figure 2.** Four hierarchical linear models of trust in political institutions across the Western/Eastern European divide. Models 1 and 2 are of trust in legal institutions, Models 3 and 4 of parliament. Models 1 and 3 are fit to post-communist data, Models 2 and 4 fit to Western European.

	Model 1 (Post-com.)	Model 2 Legal (W. Europe)	Model 3 (Post-com.)	Model 4 Parliament (W. Europe)
(Intercept)	3.76*** (0.21)	5.65*** (0.17)	3.25*** (0.19)	5.01*** (0.15)
Political interest	0.36*** (0.03)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.83*** (0.01)
Religiosity	0.43*** (0.03)	0.45*** (0.02)	0.46*** (0.03)	0.54*** (0.01)
Years of education	0.05 (0.03)	0.41*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.02)
Income (decile)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.02)
Age	-0.36*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.01)
BIC	176377.65	458067.73	173033.40	450569.31
Log Likelihood	-88146.60	-228987.71	-86474.48	-225238.50
Observations	38367	102580	38367	102580
Countries	13	19	13	19

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Regression table output

This section of the appendix contains regression tables showing the models visually presented in the main article. Each notes the relevant figure referenced.

Table 11: **Models from Figure 3.** Two hierarchical linear models of trust in political institutions, considering the interactive effect of years lived under communism with other covariates. Model 1 is a model of trust in legal institutions, Model 2 trust in parliament.

	Model 1 Legal	Model 2 Parliament
(Intercept)	4.91*** (0.20)	4.31*** (0.19)
Political interest	0.39*** (0.01)	0.80*** (0.01)
Religiosity	0.44*** (0.01)	0.52*** (0.01)
Years of education	0.32*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.01)
Income (decile)	0.32*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)
Age	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.01)
Years under communism	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Political interest x Years under	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.02)
Religiosity x Years under	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
Years of education x Years under	-0.33*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)
Income x Years under	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)
BIC	634639.10	623811.96
Log Likelihood	-317242.48	-311828.92
Observations	140947	140947
Countries	32	32

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 12: **Models from Figure 4.** Two hierarchical linear models of trust in political institutions, considering the interactive effect of communist cohort with other covariates. Model 1 is a model of trust in legal institutions, Model 2 trust in parliament.

	Model 1 Legal	Model 2 Parliament
(Intercept)	5.65*** (0.17)	5.01*** (0.15)
Political interest	0.40*** (0.02)	0.82*** (0.01)
Religiosity	0.45*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.01)
Years of education	0.41*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.02)
Income (decile)	0.32*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)
Age	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.01)
Born after communism	-1.33*** (0.29)	-1.45*** (0.26)
Adult under communism	-2.02*** (0.27)	-1.81*** (0.24)
Child during transition	-1.74*** (0.27)	-1.72*** (0.24)
Pol. interest x Born after	-0.05 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.16)
Pol. interest x Adult under	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)
Pol. interest x Child during	0.03 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)
Religiosity x Born after	-0.07 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.14)
Religiosity x Adult under	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)
Religiosity x Child during	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)
Education x Born after	-0.34 (0.28)	-0.37 (0.27)
Education x Adult under	-0.41*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.04)
Education x Child during	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Income x Born after	0.08 (0.15)	0.10 (0.14)
Income x Adult under	0.07 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)
Income x Child during	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.25*** (0.04)
BIC	634692.05	623831.27
Log Likelihood	-317209.68	-311779.29
Observations	140947	140947
Countries	32	32

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 13: **Models from Figure 5 plot (a)**. Four hierarchical linear models of trust in political institutions across the former Soviet Union/Central and Eastern European divide. Models 1 and 2 are of trust in legal institutions, Models 3 and 4 of parliament. Models 1 and 3 are fit to FSU data, Models 2 and 4 fit to CEE.

	Model 1 Legal (FSU)	Model 2 (CEE)	Model 3 Parliament (FSU)	Model 4 (CEE)
(Intercept)	3.74*** (0.46)	3.77*** (0.19)	3.01*** (0.39)	3.39*** (0.19)
Political interest	0.36*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.03)	0.62*** (0.05)	0.75*** (0.03)
Religiosity	0.44*** (0.05)	0.43*** (0.03)	0.51*** (0.05)	0.45*** (0.03)
Years of education	0.04 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.16*** (0.04)
Income (decile)	0.30*** (0.05)	0.33*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.03)
Years under communism	-0.36*** (0.05)	-0.38*** (0.03)	-0.36*** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.03)
BIC	53792.51	122643.87	52855.28	120212.81
Log Likelihood	-26858.79	-61281.17	-26390.18	-60065.64
Observations	11676	26691	11676	26691
Countries	5	8	5	8

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 14: **Models from Figure 5 plot (b)**. Four hierarchical linear models of trust in political institutions across the former Soviet Union/Central and Eastern European divide. Models 1 and 2 are of trust in legal institutions, Models 3 and 4 of parliament. Models 1 and 3 are fit to FSU data, Models 2 and 4 fit to CEE.

	Model 1 Legal (FSU)	Model 2 (CEE)	Model 3 Parliament (FSU)	Model 4 (CEE)
(Intercept)	3.58*** (0.46)	3.61*** (0.19)	2.83*** (0.39)	3.34*** (0.19)
Political interest	0.35*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.61*** (0.05)	0.76*** (0.03)
Religiosity	0.44*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.03)	0.51*** (0.05)	0.45*** (0.03)
Years of education	0.10 (0.06)	0.09* (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.17*** (0.04)
Income (decile)	0.31*** (0.05)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.03)
Child during transition	0.34*** (0.05)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.40*** (0.05)	0.12*** (0.03)
Born after communism	1.17*** (0.19)	0.71*** (0.09)	1.04*** (0.18)	0.42*** (0.09)
BIC	53780.26	122621.58	52828.75	120196.91
Log Likelihood	-26847.99	-61264.92	-26372.23	-60052.59
Observations	11676	26691	11676	26691
Countries	5	8	5	8

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 15: **Models from Figure 7 plot (a).** Four hierarchical linear models of trust in political institutions across the Western/Eastern European divide, including a covariate for quality of institutions. Models 1 and 2 are of trust in legal institutions, Models 3 and 4 of parliament. Models 1 and 3 are fit to post-communist data, Models 2 and 4 fit to Western European.

	Model 1 Legal (Post-com.)	Model 2 (W. Europe)	Model 3 Parliament (Post-com.)	Model 4 (W. Europe)
(Intercept)	4.82*** (0.23)	5.47*** (0.14)	3.47*** (0.22)	4.96*** (0.14)
Political interest	0.37*** (0.03)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.71*** (0.03)	0.83*** (0.01)
Religiosity	0.44*** (0.03)	0.45*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.03)	0.54*** (0.01)
Years of education	0.05 (0.03)	0.41*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.02)
Income (decile)	0.31*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.02)
Age	-0.40*** (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.01)
WBGI Rule of Law	1.52*** (0.20)	0.99*** (0.12)		
WBGI Voice & Accountability			0.34* (0.16)	0.27*** (0.07)
BIC	176333.13	458014.12	173039.72	450565.42
Log Likelihood	-88119.07	-228955.14	-86472.36	-225230.79
Observations	38367	102580	38367	102580
Countries	13	19	13	19

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 16: **Models from Figure 7 plot (b)**. Three linear models of trust in legal institutions, each fit to one post-communist country. Models 1, 2, and 3 are fit to Estonia, Latvia, and Bulgaria, respectively.

	Model 1 Estonia	Model 2 Latvia	Model 3 Bulgaria
(Intercept)	5.22*** (0.05)	4.10*** (0.06)	2.67*** (0.06)
Political interest	0.85*** (0.10)	0.26* (0.13)	0.48*** (0.11)
Religiosity	0.04 (0.09)	0.47*** (0.12)	0.44*** (0.12)
Years of education	0.46*** (0.11)	-0.02 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.13)
Income (decile)	0.40*** (0.08)	0.55*** (0.12)	0.21* (0.10)
Age	-0.26** (0.08)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.19 (0.10)
BIC	14066.18	10323.12	10035.86
Log Likelihood	-7004.97	-5134.64	-4991.05
Observations	3082	2191	2164

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

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