Supplemental information for

"Rule by Violence, Rule by Law: Lynching, Jim Crow, and the Continuing Evolution of Voter Suppression in the U.S."

Brad Epperly*, Christopher Witko, Ryan Strickler, & Paul White

Perspectives on Politics

*Corresponding author.
Department of Political Science
University of South Carolina
338 Gambrell Hall, 817 Henderson St.
Columbia, SC 29208
Email: epperlyb@mailbox.sc.edu

1 Descriptive statistics

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the various covariates (measured at the county level), in both the pre-Jim Crow and Jim Crow eras. Days to election is omitted: due to the nature of the variable's two-year cycle, the distribution of the values is naturally flat and identical across the two eras. Note: in all regression tables standardized coefficients are reported to simplify comparisons among the covariates. Following Hagen, Makovi & Bearman (2013), cotton dependence is measured as a given county's ratio of acreage of farmland devoted to cotton production and total agricultural acreage (from U.S. Agricultural Censuses).

Table 1: **Descriptive statistics of variables by era.** Descriptive statistics of the covariates used in analyses by era (pre-Jim Crow or after disenfranchisement took hold). Days to election is omitted due to its constant nature across both data sets.

	Pre-Jim Crow			Jim Crow Era		
	Min	Mean	Max	Min	Mean	Max
Percent Republican vote	0	32	100	0	14	100
Percent Populist vote	0	2	85	0	1	78
Percent black	0	29	93	0	33	94
Cotton dependence (%)	0	4	35	0	9	74

2 Voter disenfranchisement laws

Table 2 lays out the adoption of each of nine Jim Crow voter suppression laws by year and state across the 11 states analyzed in the manuscript. This table illustrates the fact that, with the exception of the poll tax, no other law was adopted in all Southern States. The two that come closest are literacy tests and the White primary, adopted by seven and eight states, respectively. It is for this reason that in subsequent analyses we will analyze these individually.

Table 2: **Jim Crow law adoption by state.** The nine laws used to suppress the Black vote in the South during the Jim Crow era, by state and year of adoption.

	Poll tax	Registration	Multiple box	Secret ballot	Literacy test	Property test	Understanding clause	Grandfather clause	White primary
Alabama	1901	1893		1893	1901	1901		1901	1901
Arkansas	1892			1891					1902
Florida	1889		1889						1892
Georgia	1877				1908	1908	1908	1908	1900
Kentucky	1891								
Louisiana	1898	1897		1897	1898	1898		1898	1906
Mississippi	1890			1890	1890		1890		1902
North Carolina	1900	1889	1899		1900	1900		1900	
South Carolina	1895	1882	1882		1895		1895		1896
Tennessee	1890	1889		1889					
Virginia	1902			1894	1902	1902	1902		1912

3 Probable vs. confirmed lynchings

Although the data used in the main analyses focus only on confirmed lynchings of black citizens in the Southern states analyzed, probable lynchings that could not be confirmed by Tolnay and Beck are also available. Table 3 reports the results of four models (two fixed effects, two random effects, one of each fit to pre- and post-Jim Crow data) that include probable rather than solely confirmed lynchings. Results are highly consistent with Tables 2 and 3 of the main article.

Note: due to the fact that results from fixed effects and hierarchical models are effectively identical, subsequent robustness checks report solely the results of fixed effects models. In each instance (like here and in the main manuscript) no statistical or substantive results differ if a hierarchical logistic regression model is employed rather than a model with state fixed effects.

Table 3: **Including probable lynchings.** Four models replicating the results of the analyses conducted in the main article, using probable rather than confirmed lynching events.

	Fixed effects	Random effects	Fixed effects	Random effects
	Pre-Jim Crow		Post-Jim Crow	
(Intercept)	-5.79^{***}	-6.01^{***}	-6.48^{***}	-6.96^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.22)
Days to election	-0.08^{*}	-0.08^{*}	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Percent Populist vote	0.07^{**}	0.07^{*}	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.10^{**}	-0.11^{**}	-0.13^{**}	-0.14^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Percent Black	1.55^{***}	1.53^{***}	1.49^{***}	1.49^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Percent Black squared	-0.99^{***}	-0.98^{***}	-1.03^{***}	-1.02^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Cotton dependence	0.11^{*}	0.12^{*}	0.23^{***}	0.23^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Year	-0.28^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-0.98^{***}	-0.98^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
BIC	10308.07	10237.90	15543.46	15486.92
Num. obs.	223350	223350	508834	508834

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

4 Alternative operationalizations of Jim Crow

Table 4 shows results of these alternative models of operationalizing Jim Crow. These alternatives include first just the enactment of the poll tax (the only such law adopted in all 11 states) and literacy tests rather than any two policies. These two—generally the most widely discussed and effective voter suppression laws (Rusk & Stucker 1978)—are referred to in Table 4 as the "Big two." The White primary—considered the culmination of Jim Crow policies and thus a very conservative estimate of the beginning of Jim Crow—then follows. For each, pre and post models are shown.aldre

The results of the models presented in Table 4 provides significant support for the findings presented in the analyses in the main manuscript. Regardless of the way one chooses to operationalize Jim Crow, days until election remains substantively and statistically significant (though at times at the $p < 0.1$ level) before it is put in place, whereas after its estimated coefficient shrinks (often markedly) and is no longer statistically significant. Percent Republican and percent Populist change slightly, no doubt a function of the changing nature of what post constitutes, with some states never entering into the "post" category, while other states doing so almost immediately due to the early passage fo the specific single policy in question.

Table 5 reports similar models to those above, using the alternative coding schemes for Jim Crow adoption. Instead of being fit to only confirmed lynchings, however, models are fit to both confirmed and probable lynchings.

Table 6 reports similar models to those above, but uses the date of disenfranchisement as the "disenfranchising conventions" states held to revise their constitutions.

Table 4: **Alternative operationalizations of Jim Crow.** Fixed effects models employing alternative ways of operationalizing Jim Crow's institutionalization. Big two refers to those county-months where both the poll tax and literacy test were in effect.

	Big two		White primary	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
(Intercept)	-5.97^{***}	-6.84^{***}	-5.85^{***}	-6.98^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Days to election	$-0.05^{\dagger}$	-0.02	-0.08^{**}	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Percent Populist vote	0.10^{***}	-0.07^{**}	0.08^{***}	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.11^{**}	$-0.16^{\dagger}$	-0.11^{**}	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Percent Black	1.55^{***}	1.42^{***}	1.48^{***}	1.47^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.11)	(0.19)
Percent Black squared	-1.02^{***}	-0.97^{***}	-0.98^{***}	-1.00^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.16)
Cotton dependence	0.17^{***}	0.17^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.21^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Year	-0.66^{***}	-0.98^{***}	-0.51^{***}	-0.93^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
BIC	16513.23	7910.91	15952.64	8450.35
Num. obs.	399488	332696	403710	328474

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 5: **Probable lynchings and alternative operationalizations of Jim Crow.** Fixed effects models employing alternative ways of operationalizing Jim Crow's institutionalization when fit to models estimating confirmed and probable lynchings. Big two refers to those county-months where both the poll tax and literacy test were in effect.

	Big two		White primary	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
(Intercept)	-5.92^{***}	-6.51^{***}	-5.82^{***}	-6.76^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Days to election	-0.06^{*}	-0.03	-0.08^{**}	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Percent Populist vote	0.10^{***}	-0.06^{**}	0.08^{***}	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.10^{**}	-0.11	-0.11^{**}	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Percent Black	1.58^{***}	1.50^{***}	1.50^{***}	1.50^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.11)	(0.18)
Percent Black squared	-1.04^{***}	-1.02^{***}	-0.99^{***}	-1.01^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Cotton dependence	0.18^{***}	0.17^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.19^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Year	-0.61^{***}	-0.94^{***}	-0.49^{***}	-0.87^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
BIC	17233.51	8705.25	16652.96	9263.65
Num. obs.	399488	332696	403710	328474

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 6: **Disenfranchising conventions as operationalization of Jim Crow.** Four logistic regression models of confirmed and probable lynchings (with state fixed effects not reported) using a constitutional convention or amendment (rather than statute) as the means to operationalize the start of the Jim Crow era.

	Pre-Jim Crow		Jim Crow Era	
	Confirmed	Probable	Confirmed	Probable
(Intercept)	-5.47^{***}	-5.45^{***}	-6.88^{***}	-6.70^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Days to election	-0.07^{*}	-0.07^{*}	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Percent Populist vote	0.08^{**}	0.08^{**}	-0.04^{*}	-0.04^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.10^{*}	-0.10^{*}	-0.15^{**}	-0.14^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Percent Black	1.61^{***}	1.63^{***}	1.48^{***}	1.50^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Percent Black squared	-1.13^{***}	-1.14^{***}	-0.98^{***}	-0.98^{***}
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Cotton dependence	0.17^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.21^{***}	0.20^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Year	-0.18^{**}	-0.17^{**}	-1.02^{***}	-0.97^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
BIC	11340.69	11794.62	12997.79	14052.66
Num. obs.	236734	236734	495450	495450

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

5 The "Era of Lynching"

As the plot of lynching events over time in the manuscript illustrates, lynchings declined throughout the first half of the twentieth century (with occasional spikes), such that leading historians of the phenomenon often refer to the "era of lynching" as approximately the five decades after 1880 (Waldrep 2002). While our models all include a secular trend covariate to capture this decline, it is possible that the null results of the political covariates in Jim Crow-era models are a function of the comparable rarity of these events after the "era of lynching" ended, as the leading lynching data we employ extend to 1952 (Tolnay & Beck 1995, Cook 2012, Bailey & Tolnay 2015). As such, in Table 7 we fit Jim Crow-era models to subsets of the data. That is, *after* the adoption of Jim Crow in each state, but ending the analyses in 1925, 1930, and 1935 (rather than 1952); these are Models 2–4 in Table 7, respectively, while Model 1 is the Jim Crow-era data to the 1952. *Note*, Table 7 does not report pre-Jim Crow era analyses, as the question here is whether the models of the Jim Crow legalized disenfranchisement era are driven by the inclusion of observations going to 1952.

The consistency of the results in Table 7 is remarkable: despite Model 2 being fit to less than half as many observations, there are only marginal differences in coefficient estimates and errors, and no changes in substantive inferences. The same holds true for Models 3 and 4. As such, we can safely surmise that the lack of any relationship between politics and lynchings in the Jim Crow era is the result of the relative infrequency of lynchings in the second quarter of the twentieth century.

Table 7: **Jim Crow era analyses ending before the 1950s.** Four logistic regression models (with state fixed effects) that conduct analyses from the adoption of the second Jim Crow law until the date specified, to test the possibility that non-significance of the political covariates is driven by when analyses end.

	Model 1 (until 1952)	Model 2 (until 1925)	Model 3 (until 1930)	Model 4 (until 1935)
(Intercept)	-6.62^{***}	-6.22^{***}	-6.36^{***}	-6.42^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Days to election	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Percent Populist vote	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.14^{**}	-0.11^{*}	-0.10^{*}	-0.11^{*}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Percent Black	1.48^{***}	1.48^{***}	1.49^{***}	1.50^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Percent Black squared	-1.02^{***}	-1.03^{***}	-1.03^{***}	-1.02^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Cotton dependence	0.24^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.22^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Year	-1.03^{***}	-0.74^{***}	-0.83^{***}	-0.87^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
BIC	14433.93	11995.25	12770.24	13536.65
Num. obs.	508834	228500	279432	331640

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

6 Count models

As discussed in the manuscript, results are also largely robust to negative binomial models taking into account the small portion of county-months that observed more than one lynching event. Tables 8 and 9 show model results for zero-inflated negative binomial models of lynching before and after the adoption of two Jim Crow voter suppression policies for confirmed and confirmed/probable lynchings, respectively. Results are strongly supportive of the findings in manuscript, with the only changes being slight increases in the standard errors around the coefficient estimates for percent Republican and Populist in the pre-Jim Crow models.

Table 8: **Count models of lynching events.** Zero-inflated negative binomial models of confirmed lynching events in the pre- and post-Jim Crow American South.

	Pre-Jim Crow	Post-Jim Crow
(Intercept)	-5.51^{***}	-6.57^{***}
	(0.16)	(0.10)
Days to election	-0.10^{*}	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Percent Populist vote	0.08^{*}	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.13^{**}	-0.19^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Percent Black	1.69^{***}	1.58^{***}
	(0.17)	(0.14)
Percent Black squared	-1.10^{***}	-1.11^{***}
	(0.14)	(0.12)
Cotton dependence	0.08	0.23^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.04)
Year	-0.34^{***}	-1.13^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.05)
log(theta)	-4.29^{***}	-4.12^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.07)
Zero model intercept	-6.03	-9.07
	(30.67)	(118.89)
AIC	10715.93	15648.45
Num. obs.	223350	508834

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 9: **Count models of probable and confirmed lynching events.** Zero-inflated negative binomial models of probable and confirmed lynching events in the pre- and post-Jim Crow American South.

	Pre-Jim Crow	Post-Jim Crow
(Intercept)	-5.57^{***}	-6.42^{***}
	(0.25)	(0.11)
Days to election	-0.09^{*}	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Percent Populist vote	0.07^{*}	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.11^{*}	-0.17^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Percent Black	1.73^{***}	1.61^{***}
	(0.16)	(0.14)
Percent Black squared	-1.10^{***}	-1.13^{***}
	(0.14)	(0.11)
Cotton dependence	0.09	0.23^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.04)
Year	-0.34^{***}	-1.08^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.04)
log(theta)	-4.22^{***}	-4.05^{***}
	(0.22)	(0.09)
Zero model intercept	-3.94	-5.96
	(10.54)	(22.89)
AIC	11163.62	16868.56
Num. obs.	223350	508834

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

7 Rare events logit

The models presented in the main manuscript are logistic regressions with state fixed effects, or hierarchical logistic regression models with state-varying intercepts. Given the relative rarity of the event (lynching events at the county-month level) in question, it is possible that the maximum likelihood estimation of the logistic regression may suffer from small-sample bias (the smallness being the number of events in the data, not the overall number of observations). As such, Table 10 shows the results rare events logistic regression models to assuage the reader that the main results presented in the manuscript are unaffected by such concerns.

Table 10: **Rare events logit and confirmed lynching events.** Normal and rare events logistic models of confirmed lynching events before and after the institutionalization of Jim Crow voter disenfranchisement laws in the American South.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Pre-Jim Crow		Jim Crow era	
	Logit	Rare events	Logit	Rare events
(Intercept)	-5.80^{***}	-5.78^{***}	-6.62^{***}	-6.61^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Days to election	-0.09^{*}	-0.09^{*}	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Percent Populist vote	0.08^{**}	0.08^{**}	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.11^{**}	-0.11^{*}	-0.14^{**}	-0.14^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Percent Black	1.53^{***}	1.52^{***}	1.48^{***}	1.48^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Percent Black squared	-0.99^{***}	-0.98^{***}	-1.02^{***}	-1.02^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Cotton dependence	0.11^{*}	0.11^{*}	0.24^{***}	0.24^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Year	-0.29^{***}	-0.29^{***}	-1.03^{***}	-1.03^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
BIC	9912.26	9912.26	14433.93	14433.93
Num. obs.	223350	223350	508834	508834

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

8 State fixed effects

Table 11 reproduces Table 2 of the main article, this time including the estimates for the state fixed (and random) effects (coefficients for Alabama, being the reference category, are not estimated in the fixed effects models).

Table 11: **Reporting state fixed effects.** Logistic regression models of lynching by county-month in 11 Southern states before and after the institutionalization of Jim Crow voter suppression laws. This reproduces the results in the article, this time including the state fixed effects.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	-5.80^{***}	-6.05^{***}	-6.62^{***}	-7.08^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.22)
Days to election	-0.09^{*}	-0.09^{*}	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Percent Populist vote	0.08^{**}	0.08^{**}	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.11^{**}	-0.11^{**}	-0.14^{**}	-0.14^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Percent Black	1.53^{***}	1.50^{***}	1.48^{***}	1.47^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Percent Black squared	-0.99^{***}	-0.97^{***}	-1.02^{***}	-1.02^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Cotton dependence	0.11^{*}	0.12^{*}	0.24^{***}	0.24^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Year	-0.29^{***}	-0.29^{***}	-1.03^{***}	-1.03^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Alabama		0.23		0.45
		(0.11)		(0.08)
Arkansas	0.07	0.30	-0.26^{*}	0.19
	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Florida	-0.40	-0.12	0.36^{**}	0.81
	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Georgia	-0.74^{***}	-0.47	-0.91^{***}	-0.42
	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.18)
Kentucky	0.12	0.36		
	(0.18)	(0.09)		
Louisiana	0.45^{**}	0.69	-0.01	0.44
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Mississippi	0.10	0.34	0.23^{*}	0.68
	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.06)
North Carolina	-1.22^{***}	-0.87	-1.25^{***}	-0.74
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.16)
South Carolina	-0.44	-0.14	-0.78^{***}	-0.31
	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.09)
Tennessee	0.15	0.37	-0.09	0.37
	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.09)
Virginia	-0.92^{***}	-0.61	-2.05^{***}	-1.39
	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.28)	(0.23)
BIC	9912.26	9841.85	14433.93	14376.38
Num. obs.	223350	223350	508834	508834

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

9 The use of a seasonal dummy

Existing sociological studies of lynching suggest there were consistent seasonal fluctuations in the prevalence of lynching. We refrain from including such a covariate in the main analyses because it is clearly not causing variation in our main political covariates: the electoral calendar is set and on a two-year rather than one-year seasonal cycle, and the performance of Populist parties is unrelated to the season. That said, given federal elections always occur at the same time, we cannot say that the seasonal dummy is entirely unassociated with our days to election covariate, by a simple function of the electoral calendar and seasons. The inclusion of seasonal dummies would therefore make estimating the effects of days to election more difficult.

To account for this, and to counter concerns our days to election covariate is just capturing seasonal effects, Table 12 reports the results of six models. Models 1 and 4 reproduce the original pre-Jim Crow and Jim Crow-era models from the manuscript, Models 2 and 5 replace days to election with seasonal dummies, and Models 3 and 6 include both days to election and the seasonal dummies.

Comparing across these models allows us to conclude that our results are not merely a function of seasonal effects rather than political/electoral factors. There are four reasons. First, the coefficient for the percent of Populist vote remains completely unaffected—both before and during Jim Crow—by in the inclusion of the seasonal dummies, and thus one important aspect of the political threat theory remains strong. Second, while the seasonal dummy as expected captures significant variation of days to election, as the covariate for days to election is thus as expected attenuated, its inclusion significantly worsens model fit. Looking at BIC, we see strong evidence to support the use of days to election rather than the seasonal dummies (the difference in BIC is > 7), and overwhelmingly evidence against using both days to election and the seasonal dummies (BIC difference is > 18) in the same model (Raftery 1995). Third, the coefficient for summer (the season where lynchings were observed to increase in frequency) is nearly 100% larger under Jim Crow (Models 5–6) than before (Models 2–3). If the days to election covariate was simply capturing the seasonal patterns, we would thus not expect its effects to evaporate after legalized disenfranchisement; this seasonal pattern therefore provides further support for our theoretical insights, acting as a secondary test of the empirical implications of our argument. Fourth, the model fit results for the Jim Crow-era models (4–6) provide further evidence that days to election is important before but not during Jim Crow. Once legalized disenfranchisement is in place, BIC scores strongly support the use of the seasonal dummies rather than days to election (BIC difference

Table 12: **The inclusion of seasonal effects.** Logistic regression models (state fixed effects not shown) that include seasonal dummy variables. Models 1 and 4 report the original pre-Jim Crow and Jim Crow era models from the manuscript, whereas Models 2–3 and 5–6 report these replacing (days to election) or adding seasonal effects.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
		Pre Jim Crow			Jim Crow Era	
(Intercept)	-5.80^{***}	-5.78^{***}	-5.78^{***}	-6.62^{***}	-6.73^{***}	-6.74^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Days to election	-0.09^{*}	-0.04		-0.00	0.05	
	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.03)	
Percent Populist vote	0.08^{**}	0.08^{**}	0.08^{**}	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent Republican vote	-0.11^{**}	-0.11^{**}	-0.11^{**}	-0.14^{**}	-0.14^{**}	-0.14^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Percent Black	1.53^{***}	1.53^{***}	1.53^{***}	1.48^{***}	1.48^{***}	1.48^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Percent Black squared	-0.99^{***}	-0.98^{***}	-0.98^{***}	-1.02^{***}	-1.02^{***}	-1.02^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Cotton dependence	0.11^{*}	0.11^{*}	0.11^{*}	0.24^{***}	0.24^{***}	0.24^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Year	-0.29^{***}	-0.29^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-1.03^{***}	-1.03^{***}	-1.03^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Spring		-0.17	-0.19		0.07	0.09
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Summer		0.22^{*}	0.23^{*}		0.39^{***}	0.39^{***}
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Winter		-0.15	-0.18		-0.11	-0.08
		(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.09)	(0.09)
BIC	9912.26	9930.58	9919.64	14433.93	14433.59	14422.73
Num. obs.	223350	223350	223350	508834	508834	508834

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

> 10), which is the opposite of what we observe in the pre-Jim Crow era models where we theorize electoral factors should better capture the data-generating process.

10 Democratic control of states after Reconstruction

Tables 13– 16 detail the partisan control of state governments in the 11 states we analyze from 1876–1900.[1] They include the partisanship of the governor and the share of seats controlled by Democrats in the upper and lower legislative chambers. These data show that though Democrats were largely in control during this time, significant variation in the degree to which this is the case obtained. They also report the county with the lowest Democratic performance in the previous electoral cycle. This illustrates that even in those contexts where Democrats might control 90% of the seats in each chamber of the legislature, they still faced myriad regions where they could not secure even a quarter of the vote.

References

Bailey, Amy Kate & Stewart E. Tolnay. 2015. *Lynched: The victims of southern mob violence*. UNC Press Books.

Burnham, Walter Dean. 1984. *Partisan division of American state governments, 1834-1985*. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Cook, Lisa D. 2012. "Converging to a National Lynching Database: Recent Developments and the Way Forward." *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History* 45(2):55–63.

Hagen, Ryan, Kinga Makovi & Peter Bearman. 2013. "The influence of political dynamics on southern lynch mob formation and lethality." *Social forces* p. sot093.

Raftery, Adrian E. 1995. "Bayesian model selection in social research." *Sociological methodology* pp. 111–163.

Rusk, Jerrold G. & John J. Stucker. 1978. The effect of the southern system of election laws on voting participation: A reply to VO Key, Jr. In *The History of American Electoral Behavior*, ed. Joel H. Silbey, A.G. Bogue, W.H. Flanigan & Lee Benson. Vol. 198 Princeton University Press.

Tolnay, Stewart E. & E.M. Beck. 1995. *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882–1930*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Waldrep, Christopher. 2002. *The Many Faces of Judge Lynch: Extralegal Violence and Punishment in America*. Springer.

[1] Data are drawn from Burnham (1984).

Table 13: **Democratic control of Southern states.** Partisan control of the executive and Democratic representation in the upper and lower houses of state legislatures from 1876–1900, as well as the lowest Democratic county vote share in that state (in the previous election, for reference to models using that measure). Table omits years when the first three partisan control variables do not differ from the previous year(s).

State	Year	Governor	% Seats (upper)	% Seats (lower)	Lowest district %
Alabama	1876	Democratic	100	80	14
	1878	Democratic	94	91	14
	1880	Democratic	100	94	0
	1882	Democratic	94	77	0
	1884	Democratic	91	93	15
	1886	Democratic	97	83	14
	1888	Democratic	97	93	14
	1890	Democratic	100	97	39
	1892	Democratic	79	61	21
	1894	Democratic	73	65	21
	1896	Democratic	67	74	22
	1898	Democratic	67	74	23
	1900	Democratic	97	91	23
Arkansas	1876	Democratic	94	82	3
	1878	Democratic	94	87	3
	1880	Democratic	97	86	14
	1882	Democratic	90	83	12
	1884	Democratic	94	81	12
	1886	Democratic	94	77	12
	1888	Democratic	90	82	18
	1890	Democratic	90	83	18
	1892	Democratic	91	85	18
	1894	Democratic	97	88	35
	1896	Democratic	94	85	35
	1898	Democratic	100	98	23
	1900	Democratic	100	96	23
Florida	1876	Democratic	62	60	22
	1879	Democratic	62	60	23
	1880	Democratic	84	76	23
	1882	Democratic	53	45	23
	1884	Democratic	53	63	23
	1886	Democratic	81	78	24
	1888	Democratic	84	87	24
	1890	Democratic	97	100	34
	1892	Democratic	97	97	47
	1894	Democratic	97	94	43
	1896	Democratic	97	93	43
	1898	Democratic	100	100	50
	1900	Democratic	100	100	55

Table 14: **Democratic control of Southern states.** Partisan control of the executive and Democratic representation in the upper and lower houses of state legislatures from 1876–1900, as well as the lowest Democratic county vote share in that state (in the previous election, for reference to models using that measure). Table omits years when the first three partisan control variables do not differ from the previous year(s).

State	Year	Governor	% Seats (upper)	% Seats (lower)	Lowest district %
Georgia	1876	Democratic	98	96	0
	1878	Democratic	100	98	0
	1880	Democratic	98	94	13
	1882	Democratic	100	97	13
	1886	Democratic	100	98	0
	1888	Democratic	98	98	22
	1890	Democratic	100	98	22
	1892	Democratic	98	91	37
	1894	Democratic	86	72	36
	1896	Democratic	84	81	22
	1898	Democratic	98	97	22
	1900	Democratic	98	95	47
Kentucky	1876	Democratic	84	89	16
	1878	Democratic	97	87	14
	1880	Democratic	84	83	8
	1882	Democratic	78	72	8
	1884	Democratic	87	89	13
	1886	Democratic	92	79	11
	1888	Democratic	84	74	10
	1890	Democratic	82	86	8
	1892	Democratic	74	70	8
	1894	Democratic	71	73	5
	1895	Republican	58	46	5
	1897	Republican	71	71	28
	1899	Republican	63	66	0
Louisiana	1876	Republican	42	39	NA
	1878	Democratic	56	54	8
	1879	Democratic	86	79	8
	1882	Democratic	89	82	8
	1884	Democratic	86	85	5
	1888	Democratic	87	93	8
	1890	Democratic	89	88	8
	1892	Democratic	97	98	
	1896	Democratic	78	61	11
	1900	Democratic	100	100	23

Table 15: **Democratic control of Southern states.** Partisan control of the executive and Democratic representation in the upper and lower houses of state legislatures from 1876–1900, as well as the lowest Democratic county vote share in that state (in the previous election, for reference to models using that measure). Table omits years when the first three partisan control variables do not differ from the previous year(s).

State	Year	Governor	% Seats (upper)	% Seats (lower)	Lowest district %
Mississippi	1876	Republican	70	83	39
	1878	Democratic	92	83	37
	1881	Democratic	89	85	15
	1885	Democratic	98	92	27
	1887	Democratic	100	95	28
	1889	Democratic	100	94	NA
	1891	Democratic	100	92	NA
	1893	Democratic	100	97	NA
	1895	Democratic	100	98	42
North Carolina	1876	Democratic	80	70	6
	1878	Democratic	68	66	6
	1880	Democratic	76	69	27
	1882	Democratic	68	57	24
	1884	Democratic	86	81	24
	1886	Democratic	60	56	32
	1888	Democratic	74	69	31
	1890	Democratic	86	86	31
	1892	Democratic	92	77	23
	1894	Democratic	16	38	23
	1896	Republican	18	30	26
	1898	Republican	80	78	26
South Carolina	1876	Republican	39	46	23
	1878	Democratic	85	98	8
	1880	Democratic	94	97	6
	1882	Democratic	94	95	0
	1884	Democratic	91	96	0
	1886	Democratic	94	97	11
	1888	Democratic	100	98	29
	1890	Democratic	100	100	30
	1892	Democratic	79	71	23
	1894	Democratic	100	99	23

Table 16: **Democratic control of Southern states.** Partisan control of the executive and Democratic representation in the upper and lower houses of state legislatures from 1876–1900, as well as the lowest Democratic county vote share in that state (in the previous election, for reference to models using that measure). Table omits years when the first three partisan control variables do not differ from the previous year(s).

State	Year	Governor	% Seats (upper)	% Seats (lower)	Lowest district %
Tennessee	1876	Democratic	80	76	19
	1878	Democratic	76	78	0
	1880	Republican	60	49	0
	1882	Democratic	82	72	0
	1884	Democratic	67	82	0
	1886	Democratic	64	64	9
	1888	Democratic	70	74	9
	1890	Democratic	76	80	0
	1892	Democratic	79	71	0
	1894	Republican	61	61	6
	1896	Democratic	76	64	6
	1898	Democratic	85	73	8
	1900	Democratic	85	77	8
Virginia	1876	Democratic	86	76	26
	1877	Democratic	88	77	26
	1879	Democratic	78	83	2
	1881	Readjuster	42	42	3
	1883	Readjuster	69	64	10
	1885	Democratic	75	70	26
	1887	Democratic	65	61	18
	1889	Democratic	78	86	27
	1891	Democratic	98	97	22
	1893	Democratic	95	89	32
	1895	Democratic	88	71	28
	1897	Democratic	88	95	0
	1899	Democratic	95	93	0